Why is the Banking Sector Shrinking
Why is the Banking Sector Shrinking
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银行业为何萎缩
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Loretta J. Mester
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mitchell Berlin;Loretta J. Mester
我们实证检验了这样一个假设：获得核心存款允许银行与借款人签订合同协议，但如果银行必须为其资金支付市场利率，那么这是不可行的。获得核心存款可以使银行的资金成本免受外部冲击的影响。反过来，银行可以使其借款人免受外源信贷冲击。利用银行贷款条款调查中的大量贷款样本，我们发现，当我们控制贷款市场的竞争条件时： (ii) 核心存款资金较多的银行平均收取较高的贷款利率。这些结果表明，银行贷款的一个显着特征是企业和银行形成多期贷款关系，其中贷款不需要逐期盈亏平衡。这些结果也为去中介化提供了部分解释。随着银行越来越被迫为其越来越多的资金份额支付市场利率，多期关系贷款变得越来越不可行。本文表达的观点并不一定代表费城联邦储备银行或联邦储备系统的观点。
We empirically examine the hypothesis that access to core deposits permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers, which are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for its funds. Access to core deposits insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks. In turn, the bank can insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks. Using a large sample of loans from the Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending, we find that when we control for competitive conditions in loan markets: (i) banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more smoothing of loan rates in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk; and (ii) banks funded more heavily with core deposits charge higher loan rates on average. Together these results suggest that a distinctive feature of bank lending is that firms and banks form multiperiod lending relationships, in which loans need not break even period by period. These results also provide a partial explanation for disintermediation. As banks have increasingly been forced to pay market rates for an increasing share of their funds, multiperiod relationship lending has become increasingly less feasible. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.