Revisiting a Watermark-Based Detection Scheme to Handle Cyber-Physical Attacks
Revisiting a Watermark-Based Detection Scheme to Handle Cyber-Physical Attacks
复制标题
重新审视基于水印的检测方案来处理网络物理攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joaquín García
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
José Rubio;L. D. Cicco;Joaquín García
我们致力于检测针对网络物理系统的攻击。网络物理系统是具有新的计算、通信和互连能力的工业控制系统。在本文中，我们重新研究了Mo和Sinopoli（2009）以及Mo等人（2015）提出的检测方案的安全性。该方法补充了卡尔曼滤波器和线性二次调节器的使用，通过添加认证水印信号的完整性攻击的检测。我们表明，该方法只检测网络对手，即，攻击者有能力从系统中窃听信息，但不试图获取有关系统模型本身的任何知识。探测器无法覆盖网络物理对手，即，除了网络对手的能力之外，攻击者还能够推断系统模型以逃避检测。我们讨论了一个增强的方案，基于多水印认证信号，正确地检测两个对手的模型。
We address detection of attacks against cyber-physical systems. Cyber-physical systems are industrial control systems upgraded with novel computing, communication and interconnection capabilities. In this paper we reexamine the security of a detection scheme proposed by Mo and Sinopoli (2009) and Mo et al. (2015). The approach complements the use of Kalman filters and linear quadratic regulators, by adding an authentication watermark signal for the detection of integrity attacks. We show that the approach only detects cyber adversaries, i.e., attackers with the ability to eavesdrop information from the system, but that do not attempt to acquire any knowledge about the system model itself. The detector fails at covering cyber-physical adversaries, i.e., attackers that, in addition to the capabilities of the cyber adversary, are also able to infer the system model to evade the detection. We discuss an enhanced scheme, based on a multi-watermark authentication signal, that properly detects the two adversary models.