Sophisticated Monetary Policies * 1. a Simple Model with One-period Price Stickiness
Sophisticated Monetary Policies * 1. a Simple Model with One-period Price Stickiness
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复杂的货币政策 * 1. 具有单期价格粘性的简单模型
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通讯作者：
P. Kehoe
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作者：
A. Atkeson;V. Chari;P. Kehoe
拉姆齐的政策分析方法找到了最佳的竞争均衡给定一套可用的工具。这种方法没有提到独特的实施，即设计政策，使相关的竞争均衡是独特的。这种沉默在货币政策环境中尤其成问题，因为许多具体政策的方式导致了不确定性。我们表明，复杂的政策，这取决于私人行动的历史，可以不同的均衡路径上和关闭可以唯一实现任何期望的竞争均衡。大量文献认为，货币政策应遵循泰勒原则，以消除不确定性。我们的研究结果表明，基于这些理由遵守泰勒原则是不必要的。最后，我们表明，复杂的政策对于不完美的信息具有强大的鲁棒性。社会支持和凯瑟琳·罗尔夫（Kathleen Rolfe）提供出色的编辑协助。本文所表达的观点是作者的观点，不一定是明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行或联邦储备系统的观点。弗兰克·拉姆齐（Frank Ramsey）提出了一种现在经典的承诺下的政策分析方法。这一方法具体说明了政策制定者可用的一套工具。Ramsey问题的目的是找到在给定的一组工具下使社会福利最大化的竞争均衡。巴罗（1979）、卢卡斯和斯托基（1983）以及其他许多人通过将工具指定为外生事件的函数，将这种方法扩展到不确定性情况。这一扩展使得该方法在解决宏观经济学中的政策问题时非常有用。虽然拉姆齐方法在描述最佳竞争结果方面非常有用，但它本身并不是政策的操作指南，因为它没有告诉政策制定者如何为所有可能的历史制定政策。一种作为业务指南的方法将为每一个历史规定政策，并说明每一个历史的相应结果。在这里，我们将Chari和Kehoe（1993）的语言扩展到一个环境中，在这个环境中，决策者有承诺，以便在每次历史之后指定政策，并在每次历史之后描述持续结果。在我们的方法中，我们允许政策依赖于私人代理人过去行为的历史，并允许它们在均衡路径上和均衡路径上发生变化，我们将这样的政策称为复杂政策，并将由此产生的均衡称为复杂均衡。在许多宏观经济模型中，特别是货币模型，许多指定政策的方法导致不确定性，因此...
The Ramsey approach to policy analysis finds the best competitive equilibrium given a set of available instruments. This approach is silent about unique implementation, namely designing policies so that the associated competitive equilibrium is unique. This silence is particularly problematic in monetary policy environments where many ways of specifying policy lead to indeterminacy. We show that sophisticated policies which depend on the history of private actions and which can differ on and off the equilibrium path can uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. A large literature has argued that monetary policy should adhere to the Taylor principle to eliminate indeterminacy. Our findings say that adherence to the Taylor principle on these grounds is unnecessary. Finally, we show that sophisticated policies are robust to imperfect information.cial support and Kathleen Rolfe for excellent editorial assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Frank Ramsey proposed a now classic approach to policy analysis under commitment. This approach speci…es the set of instruments available to policymakers. The Ramsey problem is to …nd the competitive equilibrium that maximizes social welfare with the given set of instruments. Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983) among many others have extended this approach to situations with uncertainty by specifying the instruments as functions of exogenous events. This extension has made the approach very useful in addressing policy questions in macroeconomics 1. While the Ramsey approach has been very useful in characterizing the best competitive outcomes, by itself it is not an operational guide to policy in the sense that it does not tell policy-makers how to conduct policy for all possible histories. An approach that is an operational guide would specify policies for every history and would describe what the corresponding outcomes will be for every history. Here we extend the language of Chari and Kehoe (1993) to an environment in which the policymaker has commitment in order to specify policies after every history and to describe continuation outcomes after every history. In our approach, we allow policies to depend on the history of past actions by private agents and allow them to di¤er on and o¤ the equilibrium path. We label such policies sophisticated policies and label the resulting equilibrium a sophisticated equilibrium. In many macroeconomic models, especially monetary models, many ways of specifying policies lead to indeterminacy and therefore …