Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint
Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint
复制标题
软预算约束的最新理论工作
DOI：
10.1257/aer.89.2.421
复制
发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Maskin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Maskin
预算软约束是Janos Kornai在其对中央计划经济的分析中发现和研究的一种综合症（见Kornai，1980）。据说，当一家看似不盈利的企业得到政府或企业债权人的救助时，就会出现这种综合症。换句话说，企业没有固定的预算，但发现它的预算约束“软化”的注入额外的信贷时，它是在失败的边缘。科尔奈认为，软预算约束是解释社会主义经济表现的显著特征的关键因素，特别是短缺的普遍性。一个有趣的问题是，为什么中央计划经济体特别容易受到软预算限制的影响;资本主义世界很难幸免，最近亚洲的金融危机就证明了这一点，但总的来说，它并不那么脆弱。实际上，软预算约束的根源及其造成短缺和其他不良影响的机制显然也是重要的问题。虽然科尔奈的工作长期以来一直是众所周知的和赞赏，这些相关的理论问题的答案一直在冒险，直到最近。在Maskin（1996）中，我调查了这方面的一些初步努力，包括Mathias Dewatripont和Maskin（1995），他们认为信贷集中会导致软预算约束，因为它促进了企业的再融资。
The soft budget constraint is a syndrome that was identified and studied by Janos Kornai in his analysis of centrally planned economies ( see, Kornai, 1980 ) . The syndrome is said to arise when a seemingly unprofitable enterprise is bailed out by the government or the enterprise’s creditors. In other words, the enterprise is not held to a fixed budget, but finds its budget constraint ‘‘softened’’ by the infusion of additional credit when it is on the verge of failure. Kornai viewed the soft budget constraint as a crucial ingredient for explaining the salient features of socialist economic performance, in particular, the pervasiveness of shortages. One interesting puzzle is why centrally planned economies have been particularly susceptible to the influence of the soft budget constraint; the capitalist world is hardly immune, as the recent financial crisis in Asia attests, but on the whole it has proved less vulnerable. Indeed, the very origin of the soft budget constraint and the mechanism by which it gives rise to shortages and other undesirable effects are also obviously important questions. Although Kornai’s work has long been well known and appreciated, answers to these associated theoretical questions have been hazarded only recently. In Maskin ( 1996 ) , I surveyed some of the initial efforts in this direction, including Mathias Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which argues that centralization of credit can give rise to soft budget constraints because it facilitates the refinancing of