RKA Security of Identity-Based Homomorphic Signature Scheme
RKA Security of Identity-Based Homomorphic Signature Scheme
复制标题
基于身份的同态签名方案的RKA安全性
DOI：
10.1109/access.2019.2908244
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Xue Rui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chang Jinyong;Ma Hui;Zhang Anling;Xu Maozhi;Xue Rui
最近，林等人。提出了一种新的基于原始身份（IB）的同态签名方案，并通过使用任何 IB 签名方案作为构建块提出了巧妙的实现。在本文中，我们考虑针对他们的方案的一种新型攻击：相关密钥攻击（RKA）由 Bellare 和 Kohno 于 2003 年提出，并被广泛考虑用于各种密码原语。具体来说，我们首次定义了IB同态签名方案的RKA安全性。通过将签名密钥修改为其线性形式，我们证明了 Lin 等人的 IB 同态签名方案不是 RKA 安全的。但对其稍作修改即可在最初的假设下产生 RKA 安全。我们还提供了详细的安全证明。然而，我们注意到，Lin等人的方案上的RKA之所以能够成功，在于RKA超出了其安全模型。最后，数值分析和实验结果表明，我们的修改方案并没有明显降低Lin等人方案的计算效率。
Recently, Lin et al. proposed a new primitive identity-based (IB) homomorphic signature scheme and presented an ingenious implement by using any IB-signature scheme as a building block. In this paper, we consider a new type of attack on their scheme: Related-key attack (RKA) is introduced by Bellare and Kohno in 2003 and widely considered for kinds of cryptographic primitives. Specifically, for the first time, we define the RKA security of IB-homomorphic signature scheme. By modifying the signing secret key as its linear form, we prove that Lin et al.’s IB-homomorphic signature scheme is not RKA secure. But a slight modification of it yields an RKA secure one under the original assumptions. We also present security proof in detail. However, we remark that the reason why RKA on Lin et al.’s scheme can be successful lies in that RKA is outside of its security model. Finally, the numerical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our modified scheme does not distinctly decrease the computational efficiency of Lin et al.’s scheme.