The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition
The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition
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印巴军备竞赛
DOI：
10.1177/0022002794038002002
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Ido Oren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ido Oren
作者将他在超级大国军备竞赛背景下发展起来的军备理论应用于南亚。经验发现与超级大国的情况一致：印度和巴基斯坦被发现拥有高水平的军备和低水平的军备，反之亦然。这样的结果在分析上类似于关于联盟的经验证据，这些证据表明，包括印度和巴基斯坦在内的国家往往与实力较强的国家结盟，对抗实力较弱的一方。在这两个案例中，证据分别与关于内部和外部力量平衡的传统智慧相矛盾。作者的理论解释了这一反常现象：国家不仅将实力作为能力的指标，还将其作为意图的指标：在敌对行为数量相同的情况下，弱国似乎比强国更具攻击性。因此，如果国家对意图的担忧超过对权力的担忧，它们会被更强大的国家吸引，恰恰是因为它们的实力，而不是尽管如此。
The author applies to South Asia a theory of armament that he developed in the context of the superpowers' arms rivalry. The empirical findings are consistent with the results for the superpowers' case: India and Pakistan are found to have matched high levels of armaments with low levels and vice versa. Such results are analytically similar to empirical evidence on alliances showing that states, including India and Pakistan, often ally with the stronger against the weaker side. In both cases the evidence contradicts conventional wisdom on power balancing, internal and external, respectively. The authors' theory explains this otherwise anomalous phenomenon: states use strength not just as an indicator of capability but also of intentions: given the same amount of hostile behavior, weak states appear more aggressive than strong ones. Hence, if states worry about intentions more than about power, they would be attracted to stronger states precisely because of their strength, not despite it.