An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public-private partnership projects
An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public-private partnership projects
复制标题
用户付费公私合作项目的演化博弈分析
DOI：
10.1108/ecam-06-2020-0460
复制
发表时间：
2020-10-28
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Fan, Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Song, Danrong;Song, Jinbo;Fan, Yu
近年来，随着基础设施和公共服务需求的不断增长，PPP-UP引起了人们的极大关注。然而，在用户关注使用付费、私营部门关注其投资回报的同时，公共部门更关注公共资金的有效利用。为了分析各利益相关者加入PPP-UP的意愿，构建了一个三方参与的演化博弈模型，设计/方法/途径建立了一个考虑用户付费公私合作项目（user-pay public-private-partnership project，PPP-UP）中用户、公共部门和私营部门的演化博弈模型。分析了8种情形的均衡和博弈的演化稳定策略，得到了相应的稳定条件。一个情况下，所有三个球员都愿意在理论上进行合作，也研究。研究结果表明，通过适当调整影响因素，三方合作状态可以沿着一定的演化趋势发生变化。第二，很难通过价格补偿和建设与运营补偿的微小变化来修改不令人满意的演化稳定性。第三，有必要让用户参与到PPP-UP的决策过程中，并考虑到他们对收益和支付的需求。独创性/价值在本文中，我们专注于PPP-UP研究公共和私营部门与用户之间的互动。基于演化博弈的分析，为了促进项目的成功实施和发展，需要几个条件来确保三方合作。然后提出了几项建议，供决策者在公私伙伴关系-UP。
PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.