Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
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DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
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发表时间：
2001-04-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Yilankaya, O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ely, JC;Yilankaya, O
一群参与者被随机配对来玩一个标准型博弈G。这个博弈中的收益代表了与各种结果相关的适应度。每个人都对结果或游戏有偏好，并根据这些偏好选择最佳行动。然而，这些偏好不需要与健身收益相一致。当进化根据个体所采取行动的适应性来选择个体时，总博弈的分布必然是G的纳什均衡。对进化过程的弱附加假设意味着完美均衡。(C)北京：科学出版社.
A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes or the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to, those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. (C) 2001 Academic Press.