Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks
Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks
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DOI:
10.1587/transinf.e94.d.2095
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发表时间:
2011-11
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Seonghan Shin;K. Kobara;H. Imai
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文献类型:
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作者:
Seonghan Shin;K. Kobara;H. Imai
An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26]is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t>1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP++) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP++ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP++ protocol.