Identity, Cause, and Mind
Identity, Cause, and Mind
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身份、原因和心灵
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0149.1985.tb01450.x
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jane Heal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jane Heal
本书收录了舒梅克在过去十五年中撰写的十五篇实质性文章，它们主要关注的是心灵哲学。这里所辩护的观点与舒梅克在《自我认识和自我同一性》中所辩护的“标准论”观点形成了相当大的对比。舒梅克仍然相信心理学和行为学概念之间存在概念上的联系，但他现在认为，功能主义对这种联系的逻辑形式提供了更好的解释。一个统一的线程在收集，因此关注阐明功能主义，并捍卫它对各种困难，例如问题所造成的感官“感质”。而那些不直接涉及这些问题的作品，涉及的是财产，变化和身份等概念，这些概念为功能主义提供了形而上学的基础。其中一些文章已经广为人知。例如，《人物及其过去》一书引入了“准记忆”的概念，并考察了如何根据融合或分裂的人物来修改关于个人身份和记忆的观点。另一个熟悉的作品是令人钦佩的巧妙的“时间不变”。在最近的一些论文中，“功能主义的一些变体”（Some Varieties of Functionalism）提出了一个有用的区别，在这些区别中，物理属性可以说是“实现”心理属性。假设函数式的疼痛解释是正确的。那么，一个处于痛苦中的生物将具有一个属性，比如说9，它代表着与输入、输出和其他属性的定义因果关系。那么我们是说，实现痛苦的心理属性的是9本身，还是说，它是拥有9的属性，并且9扮演了一个
This book contains fifteen substantial essays written by Shoemaker during the last fifteen years and their primary concern is the philosophy of mind. The views defended here exhibit considerable contrast to the “criteriological” view defended earlier by Shoemaker in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Shoemaker is still convinced that there are conceptual connections between psychological and behavioural notions, but he thinks now that functionalism provides a better account of the logical shape of the link. A unifying thread in the collection is thus a concern to elucidate functionalism and to defend it against various difficulties, for example the problem posed by sensory “qualia”. And those pieces which are not directly on these matters deal with notions like property, change and identity, which provide the metaphysical underpinnings of functionalism. Some of the essays are already well known. For example there is “Persons and their pasts” which introduces the notion of “quasi memory” and examines how views about personal identity and memory would have to be modified in the light of fusing or dividing persons. Another familiar piece is the admirably ingenious “Time without change”. It is good to have these available here.Of the more recent papers “Some varieties of functionalism” sets out a useful distinction between ways in which physical properties may be said to “realise” psychological properties. Suppose that a functional style of account of pain is correct. Then for a creature to be in pain will be for it to have a property, say 9, which stands in the defining causal relations with inputs, outputs and other properties. Now do we say that what realises the psychological property of suffering pain is 9, by itself, or do we say that it is the property of having 9 and being such that 9 plays a