Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
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没有附带支付的游戏的价值：当前概念的一些困难
作者：
A. Roth
考虑了两种无侧支付博弈的解概念：由Harsanyi [6，7]提出的稳定谈判解和由Shapley [19]首次提出的A-转移值。一些例子的游戏被认为是这两个解决方案的概念产生的结果是非常违反直觉的，这似乎是不一致的假设，游戏是由理性的球员。
Two solution concepts for games without sidepayments are considered: the stable bargaining solution proposed by Harsanyi [6, 7], and the A-transfer value first proposed by Shapley [19]. Some examples of games are considered for which both solution concepts yield results which are highly counter-intuitive, and which seem to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the games are played by rational players.