Consciousness. A user’s guide
Consciousness. A user’s
guide
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用户的意识。
DOI:
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发表时间:
2003
影响因子:
6
通讯作者:
Prof. D. A. S. Compston
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Prof. D. A. S. Compston
This review is like a runner completing the London Marathon dressed as Winnie the Pooh – comes in late but covered the ground. At first, things seemed difficult: the schoolboy philosopher dividing his time between Shakespeare and Newton; Adam Zeman’s failure to finesse gender when dealing with the generic pronoun; the possibility of confusion between consciousness and perception; the proud dad overexposing us to paediatric bon-mots better kept for family reunions; much use of the colon and semicolon; and, in any case, what was Dr Zeman doing boning-up on philosophy in the library of the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital when he was meant to be our senior registrar in neurology? Put aside for some months, Consciousness: a user’s guide eventually made it to the desktop and with that came a silent and sincere apology for ever having questioned its scholarship and authority. In the event, Dr Zeman writes well. He uses short sentences. They convey meaning.He coins neat turns of phrase. They please the ear of the reader. His use of metaphor and simile are apt. Some of the things Natalya, Flora and Ben say are really helpful in formulating the problems. From the one, on why do we sleep; “because it’s night”; to another “cos if we didn’t we’d get really tired and stuff”. That just about has it; the reluctant somnambulist playing safe through convenient but forced hibernation; or the exhausted physiological frame hunkering down for a re-stock of the brainstem barrels. The richness and range of quotations deployed by Adam Zeman reflects wide reading and not just creative use of reference books. Adam will have come across the writings of that other former resident of Norwich, Thomas Brown(e) – his 17th century publishers were inconsistent in use of the final “e” – whilst grazing in the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital library. As gentlemen philosophers and physicians,Brown and Zeman have much in common. Serial quotations from Virginia Woolf ’s Orlando neatly sidestep the pronoun issue since Orlando is a serial gender swapper. Although advised to skip it (as an expert), I did sneak a look at how the brain works. Zeman is steeped in classical neurodoctrine. He is Sherringtonian in his view of the central nervous system as the great conductor of an otherwise cacaphonous band of reflexes. He is Jacksonian rather than phrenological in his view that lesions faithfully reproduce discrete syndromes without necessarily denoting localized function. He is Magounian in having the brain stem reticular activating formation as the fount of awareness and electrical activity in the brain. He is happy to measure consciousness using the Glasgow coma scale. Perhaps,he gives 40Hz rhythms shorter shrift as the electrical signature of consciousness than some would want. He likes history as played by medical historians: spats between Cajal and Golgi, and the Cartesian boy with the burning foot from De Homine (1662), rather than medicine as historical context – how the profession functioned in contest with prevalent social circumstances. His clinical anecdotes are telling.Some are chilling.He reports the recollections of those who were conscious of being thought unconscious (which they were not) whilst paralysed during general anaesthesia. In short, he plays neuroscience with a straight bat. This matters when Adam Zeman gets us round the tricky issues of defining consciousness. Here, others have come unstuck. Helpfully, Zeman starts with what is obvious. You know what unconscious, as in slugged out, is; well, conscious is the opposite of that. Now we’ve got that straight, you can handle another dimension, as in consciousness as awareness. And so on, avoiding the trap of others who get turned inside out by semantic constraints making it necessary to deny consciousness, as defined, in sentient animals. Don’t tell me my dog is not conscious when he (here, the pronoun is accurate requiring no generic or neutral sophistry) distracts all human and feline members of the household so as to ensure un-interrupted access to the cat’s food. This is surely Gerald Edelman’s “remembered present”. And on the hierarchies of consciousness in the animal kingdom, with transitions twixt monkey and chimpanzee, readers will feel much sympathy for Winnie the Pooh (after winning the London Marathon), Tigger and the Ugly Duckling in facing up to their images in the mirror. Tigger is terrified by the audacious imposter. Streetwise Winnie is calmly re-assuring. The Ugly Duckling is already fully wized-up to the identity of his (Zeman might opt for her) doppelBOOK REVIEW