Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
复制标题
通过交易市场上不可分割的商品的捐赠进行操纵
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-006-0159-2
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
B. Klaus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Atlamaz;B. Klaus
我们考虑具有异质不可分割商品的交换市场。我们感兴趣的是有效的、不受禀赋操纵的交易规则（无论是隐藏或销毁部分禀赋，还是将部分禀赋转移给另一个交易者）。我们考虑三个可操作性公理：隐藏的防，破坏的防，和转移的防。我们证明了不存在满足有效性和防隐藏性（这两者共同意味着个体理性）的规则。对于两个代理人可分离和响应的偏好，我们表明，有效的，个人理性的，和破坏性的规则存在。然而，对于某些可分离偏好的概况来说，没有任何规则是有效的、个体理性的且防破坏的。在防转移的情况下，两个代理人的情况下，效率和个人理性的兼容性扩展到无限制的域。如果有两个以上的代理人，对于某些可分离偏好的配置文件，没有规则是有效的，个人理性的，转移证明。
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.