COMMON FATE, SIMILARITY, AND OTHER INDEXES OF THE STATUS OF AGGREGATES OF PERSONS AS SOCIAL ENTITIES
COMMON FATE, SIMILARITY, AND OTHER INDEXES OF THE STATUS OF AGGREGATES OF PERSONS AS SOCIAL ENTITIES
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DOI:
10.1002/bs.3830030103
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发表时间:
1958-01-01
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影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
CAMPBELL, DT
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文献类型:
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作者:
CAMPBELL, DT
Before a social aggregate can be examined for its status as an organic system its status as entity must be evaluated. Indices of common-fate, simi-larity, and proximity may be appropriate to this task. Social groups as entities do not have an epistemological status different from such middle-sized entities as stones and rats, but are apt to be fuzzier, less discrete, less multiply confirmed, and in this sense less real. The degree of entitativity and the possibility of a sociology at a level of analysis separate from psychology is a matter for empirical determination rather than a priori decision. COMMON FATE, SIMILARITY, AND OTHER INDICES OF THE STATUS OF AGGREGATES OF PERSONS AS SOCIAL ENTITIES1 by Donald 7'. Campbell Department of Psychology, Northwestern University HERE iS currently considerable interest in efforts to apply concepts about at the level of social groupings. But for such applications to be meaningful, we should be able to test the hypothesis in specific instanices that an aggregate of per-sons behaves as a system. We should be able to find instances in which the hypothe-sis of system is confirmed, and instances in which it is not, or in which the systemicity is of lesser degree. Too frequently concepts of or or are made axiomatic and lose their status as testable hypotheses. Too frequently such concepts are used in a way which provides an infinite flexibility in ad hoc explanations, and thus lose that essen-tial rigidity which might make them testable. Yet the hypothesis of system is clearly testable in some instances. A pound of ham-burger is clearly less of a system than a one-pound living white rat, and there are many measurements possible which would docu-ment this difference. If biologists have seldom provided lists of such criteria, it is not because the difference is undemonstrable, I The completion of this paper was made possi-ble by the author's participation in the Behavioral Science Conference held at the University of New Mexico, Summer, 1957, under Project AF 49 (638)-33 sponsored by the Behavioral Science Division, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, ARDC, Professor I'aul AF Walter, principal investiga-tor. but rather because it is so obviously de-monstrable as to be a waste of laboratory effort to verify. Those interested in treating social and political organizations as systems are most frequently offered the biological organism as an example of a system. This is true both of recent conceptualizations in the behav-ioral science movement and of those avail-able at the founding of modern social sci-ence. For those interested in a functional theory of social organization, Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, Part II, The Inductions of Sociology (20), can still be recommended. The behavioral scientist will find it unacceptable in many minor details, but also profoundly modern in spirit and brilliantly suggestive of still untested re-search leads. Spencer is also free from the unwarranted ethical conclusion which has alienated so many from the organismic analogy, to wit, that not only are societies organism-like, but that it is good for them to become more so. As a militant anti-nationalist and pacifist, resisting the temp-tation to identify with the glories of Queen Victoria's expanding empire, he used the analogy as a source of concepts about proc-ess and function, rather than as a pseudo-scientific prop for an ethic. To quote from his closing chapter: Here let it once more be distinctly asserted that there exist no analogies between the body 14 15 STATUS OF AGGREGATES AS SOCIAL ENTITIES politic and a living body, save those necessitate (d bv that mutual dependence of parts which thev display in common. Though, in …