Appendix for : Opting out of Incentive Mechanisms : A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good
Appendix for : Opting out of Incentive Mechanisms : A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good
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附录：选择退出激励机制：安全作为非排他性公共物品的研究
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Parinaz Naghizadeh Ardabili;M. Liu
我们提出了两个命题来说明的主要性质的税收机制，即社会最优性和自愿参与。的证据如下直接从经典文献的VCG机制，并包括完整性。命题1：在具有由（6）给出的税收的税收机制中，报告真实类型，即，真正的效用函数ui（·）是所有用户i的支配策略。因此，实现了社会最优解。证明：当用户i报告i（·），而其他用户报告j（·），j 6= i时，用户i的总效用由下式给出：
We present two propositions to illustrate the main properties of the Pivotal mechanism, namely social optimality and voluntary participation. The proofs follows directly from the classical literature on VCG mechanisms and are included for completeness. Proposition 1: In the Pivotal mechanism with taxes given by (6), reporting the true type, i.e., the true utility function ui(·), is a dominant strategy for all users i. Therefore, the socially optimal solution is implemented. Proof: The total utility of user i when reporting ũi(·), while others report ũj(·), j 6= i, is given by: