Party polarization and legislative gridlock
Party polarization and legislative gridlock
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DOI：
10.1177/106591290105400107
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发表时间：
2001-03-01
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Jones, DR
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jones, DR
本文探讨政党如何影响立法僵局-政府无法制定政策议程上的重大建议。传统的说法认为，分裂的政党控制政府导致了这种僵局。我提供了一个替代的党派僵局模型，包括政党极化，政党席位划分，以及这两个因素之间的相互作用。使用原始数据集的主要立法建议，认为在1975年和1994年之间，我发现，分裂的政府并不影响僵局，一旦考虑到政党极化和政党席位划分。相反，我发现，更高的政党极化增加了在给定提案上遇到僵局的可能性，但这种增加的幅度会减少到一个政党接近拥有足够席位来阻止阻挠议事和否决的程度。
This article investigates how parties affect legislative gridlock-the inability of government to enact significant proposals on the policy agenda. Conventional accounts suggest that divided party control of government causes such stalemate. I offer an alternative partisan model of gridlock that incorporates party polarization, party seat division, and the interaction between these two factors. Using an original data set of major legislative proposals considered between 1975 and 1994, I find that divided government does not affect gridlock once party polarization and party seat division are taken into account. Instead, I find that higher party polarization increases the likelihood of encountering gridlock on a given proposal, but that the magnitude of this increase diminishes to the extent that a party is close to having enough seats to thwart filibusters and vetoes.