Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
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非自愿失业和隐性合同
DOI：
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
V. Chari
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Chari
本文对企业与工人之间信息不对称所导致的非自愿失业现象进行了解释。非自愿失业被定义为存在事后贸易收益的情况。提出了一种劳动合同模型，其中分配不是事后最优的。研究表明，闲暇的劣等性是非自愿失业存在的充分必要条件。
This paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers. Involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist. A model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal. It is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment.