The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators
The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators
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耻辱的代价：国际组织和外国援助惩罚人权侵犯者
DOI：
10.1177/0022343308098405
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
E. Voeten
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James H. Lebovic;E. Voeten
违反国际人权准则的人是否受到减少外国援助的惩罚？尽管有抽象的偏好，但政府往往缺乏双边惩罚违反规范者的动机。多边贷款机构，如世界银行，如果愿意考虑侵犯人权问题，可以填补这一空白，并可以绕过对评估受援国政治性质的限制。这篇文章认为，联合国人权委员会的“羞辱”，通过明确批评政府人权记录的决议，提供了关于侵犯人权的实质性信息，并为世界银行和其他自由主义多边援助机构寻求制裁侵犯人权者提供了政治掩护。统计分析支持这些理论主张。联合国人权理事会通过一项谴责一国人权记录的决议，导致多边援助，特别是世界银行的援助大幅度减少，但对该国收到的双边援助总额没有影响。这些分析还支持这样的预测，即人权的“客观”措施对多边援助的分配没有独立的影响。调查结果，这是强大的不同的模型技术和规格，表明，对违反国际人权规范的惩罚是有选择性的，国际组织在选择过程中发挥了重要作用，因此，看似象征性的决议的政治动机IO可以带来切实的后果。
Are violators of international human rights norms punished with lower levels of foreign aid? Despite their abstract preferences, governments often lack the incentive to punish norm violators bilaterally. Multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank, could fill the void if they wanted to consider human rights abuses and could bypass restrictions on evaluating the political character of recipients. This article argues that `shaming' in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, through resolutions that explicitly criticized governments for their human rights records, provided substantive information about rights abuses and gave political cover for the World Bank and other liberal multilateral aid institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. Statistical analyses support these theoretical claims. The adoption of a UNCHR resolution condemning a country's human rights record produced a sizeable reduction in multilateral, and especially World Bank, aid but had no effect on the country's aggregate bilateral aid receipts. The analyses also support predictions that `objective' measures of human rights have no independent effect on multilateral aid allocations. The findings, which are robust to different model techniques and specifications, suggest that punishment for violating international human rights norms is selective, that international organizations play an important role in the selection process and, thus, that seemingly symbolic resolutions of a politically motivated IO can carry tangible consequences.