Judgment Accuracy and the Asymmetric Cost of Errors in Distributive Bargaining
Judgment Accuracy and the Asymmetric Cost of Errors in Distributive Bargaining
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分配谈判中的判断准确性和错误的不对称成本
DOI：
10.1023/a:1008698408099
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Paul W. Paese
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Bottom;Paul W. Paese
讨价还价者通常必须尝试判断对方的偏好、信念和解决方案。描述性理论家和规范性理论家都假设准确感知对方讨价还价者的保留价格 (r.p.) 是有利的。然而，只有当低估和高估的成本对称时，无偏见的判断才是最佳的。人们发现乐观偏见在与其他类型任务相关的判断中具有适应性价值。在两项研究中，我们研究了本质上是分配性讨价还价博弈中对讨价还价区的看法与和解之间的关系。在一项主要是探索性的研究中，讨价还价者普遍存在乐观偏见（即，他们认为对方可能会比他/她真正能做出的让步更多），而乐观情绪与盈利能力呈正相关。在研究 2 中，我们操纵信息来诱导准确或有偏见的看法。乐观偏见的谈判者再次比准确或悲观偏见的谈判者达成了更有利可图的和解。乐观情绪并没有增加这两项研究陷入僵局的可能性。也没有损害双方的关系。最初的乐观情绪似乎在讨价还价中发挥着适应性作用。
Bargainers must generally attempt to judge their counterparts' preferences, beliefs, and alternatives to settlement. Both descriptive and prescriptive theorists have assumed that an accurate perception of the other bargainer's reservation price (r.p.) is advantageous. Yet, unbiased judgments are optimal only when the costs of underestimation and overestimation are symmetric. Optimistic bias has been found to have adaptive value in judgments related to other types of tasks. In two studies we examined the relationship between perceptions of the bargaining zone and settlements in essentially distributive bargaining games. In the largely exploratory study one, bargainers were generally optimistically biased (i.e., they thought their counterpart could concede more than s/he really could) and optimism was positively correlated with profitability. In study 2 we manipulated information to induce accurate or biased perceptions. Optimistically biased negotiators again reached more profitable settlements than accurate or pessimistically biased negotiators. Optimism did not increase the likelihood of impasse in either study. Nor did it damage the relationship between the parties. Initial optimism appears to play an adaptive role in bargaining.