Guns, Laws and Politics: The Political Foundations of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform
Guns, Laws and Politics: The Political Foundations of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform
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枪支、法律和政治：法治和安全部门改革的政治基础
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Louis
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作者：
Louis
尽管捐助者越来越关注安全部门改革和法治发展，但结果喜忧参半。本文探讨了受援国内的条件，塑造这些计划的结果。借鉴文献的国家建设，我认为，安全和司法机构的发展反映了政治精英和公民之间的关系。统治精英由于政治基础狭窄或对收入的任意控制而集中权力，削弱了领导人接受对行政权力的限制的动机。植根于广泛或分散的联盟而不易获得收入的政权更有可能接受法律的和体制的限制。法治发展和安全部门改革方案的结果在很大程度上取决于捐助者对这些条件的影响。我说明这些动态在三个冲突后国家，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，塞拉利昂和东帝汶，捐助者资助的方案产生了不同的结果。
AbstractDespite increasing attention by donors to Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Rule of Law development (ROL), results have been mixed. This article explores conditions within recipient states that shape the outcome of these programs. Drawing from literature on state-building, I argue that the development of security and justice institutions reflects relations among political elites and citizens. Concentration of power by ruling elites as a result of a narrow political base or discretionary control over revenue undermines incentives for leaders to accept constraints on executive power. Regimes rooted in broad or fragmented coalitions without easy access to revenue are more likely to accept legal and institutional constraints. The outcome of rule of law development and security sector reform programs is largely determined by donors’ impact on these conditions. I illustrate these dynamics in three post-conflict countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, where donor-funded programs have yielded varying results.