Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary Game Theory
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DOI：
10.1002/9780470015902.a0005457.pub2
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发表时间：
2010-11
期刊：
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
M. Broom;C. Cannings
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Broom;C. Cannings
在自然界中，个体之间为了生存和繁殖而不断进行斗争;例如，猎物与捕食者竞争，同种竞争食物和领土等资源。这些冲突的结果取决于个人采取的策略和对生殖成功的影响。进化博弈或进化冲突的理论，解决了在自然选择下，什么样的策略占上风以及这些竞争中的共存问题。最初的模型是基于同种物种之间的竞争，尽管它们现在涵盖了大量复杂的行为场景，例如雄性动物在寻找配偶时采用精心制作的行为或昂贵的身体装饰，或者在社会群体中形成统治等级。关键概念：策略是在游戏中对个人开放的可能行为。知道每个人的行为决定了游戏中所有人的回报（收益）。进化稳定策略（ESS）是一种策略，如果几乎所有人都采用这种策略，它会抵抗任何其他策略的入侵，因此会持续存在。对于一个给定的游戏，可以有一个ESS，一个以上的ESS或没有ESS。如果个体能够合作，则有可能获得比ESS下更大的收益，但这种策略不能抵抗入侵，因此是不稳定的。虽然可能有一个以上的ESS，但对于简单的两个玩家冲突，可以共存的ESS有重要的限制。更复杂的限制适用于多人冲突，而一些简单的限制可能不适用于两人冲突。由采取不同策略的个体组成的种群会随着进化动力学而变化，例如，复制动力学。进化动力学的其余点并不总是与冲突的ESS相同，在任何具体分析中都必须小心。如果种群通过突变只会在策略上发生微小的变化，那么这种变化可以用自适应动力学来模拟。关键词：战略;冲突;演化;稳定性;动态
In the natural world, there is a constant struggle between individuals to survive and reproduce; for example, prey compete against their predators and conspecifics compete for resources such as food and territory. The outcomes of these conflicts depend on the strategies adopted by individuals and impact on reproductive success. The theory of evolutionary games, or evolutionary conflicts, addresses the issues of what strategies prevail and coexistence within these competitions under natural selection. The original models were based on competitions between identical conspecifics, although they now cover a huge range of complex behavioural scenarios such as the adoption of elaborate behaviours or costly physical ornaments by male animals seeking mates or the formation of dominance hierarchies among social groups. Key Concepts: Strategies are the possible behaviours open to an individual within a game. Knowing the behaviour of each individual determines the rewards (payoffs) to all individuals in the game. An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, if played by almost all, resists invasion by any other strategy and so persists through time. It is possible to have a single ESS, more than one ESS or no ESSs for a given game. There is the potential for larger payoffs than under an ESS if individuals could co-operate, but such strategies do not resist invasion and so are unstable. While there may be more than one ESS, there are important restrictions on which can coexist for simple two-player conflicts. More complex restrictions apply for multiplayer conflicts, and some of the simpler restrictions of the two-player conflicts may not apply. A population composed of individuals playing different strategies is subject to change following evolutionary dynamics, for example, replicator dynamics. The rest points of evolutionary dynamics are not always the same as the ESSs of a conflict and care must be taken in any specific analysis. If populations are subject to only small changes in strategy through mutation, change can be modelled by adaptive dynamics. Keywords: strategy; conflict; evolution; stability; dynamics