Intervening on the Causal Exclusion Problem for Integrated Information Theory
Intervening on the Causal Exclusion Problem for Integrated Information Theory
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DOI：
10.1007/s11023-018-9456-7
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发表时间：
2018-06-01
影响因子：
7.4
通讯作者：
Mindt, Garrett
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baxendale, Matthew;Mindt, Garrett
在本文中，我们研究的因果关系框架内，综合信息理论（IIT）的意识，使其索赔。我们认为，在其目前的提法，IIT是威胁的因果排除问题。IIT的一些支持者试图通过认为IIT有资源在宏观尺度上证明真正的因果出现来挫败因果排除问题。相比之下，我们认为，他们提出的解决方案的问题是有害的循环，由于相互定义的信息和因果关系。作为一种解决方案，我们建议IIT应该采用我们提供的特定干预主义因果框架，并展示IIT如何利用这种干预主义框架来避免因果排斥问题。我们展示了我们的论点是如何与理论的方法论、经验数据和概念目标完全兼容的。
In this paper, we examine the causal framework within which integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness makes it claims. We argue that, in its current formulation, IIT is threatened by the causal exclusion problem. Some proponents of IIT have attempted to thwart the causal exclusion problem by arguing that IIT has the resources to demonstrate genuine causal emergence at macro scales. In contrast, we argue that their proposed solution to the problem is damagingly circular as a result of inter-defining information and causation. As a solution, we propose that IIT should adopt the specific interventionist causal framework that we offer and show how IIT can harness this interventionist framework to avoid the causal exclusion problem. We demonstrate how our argument remains fully compatible with the methodology, empirical data, and conceptual aims of the theory.