Evolutionary stable investment in products that confer both an individual benefit and a public good.
Evolutionary stable investment in products that confer both an individual benefit and a public good.
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对既带来个人利益又带来公共利益的产品的进化稳定投资。
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Kassen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Sherratt;G. Roberts;R. Kassen
如果微生物的竞争者可以搭便车，那么为什么微生物要制造胞外酶呢？同样，当其他动物可以利用这种储存资源时，为什么动物要把种子储存起来呢？如果假设投资者直接从他们所进行的投资的一部分中受益，那么这类一般问题的解决方案就会变得显而易见。因此，当个人从其投资的一部分 p 中受益，但与系统中的其他个人分享其余部分时，就会形成一个进化稳定的投资水平，p 值越高，投资水平就越高。这些进化上稳定的投资点标志着几种经典游戏的交汇点，因此投资的变化可以将互动从一种游戏类型转移到另一种游戏类型。当投资仅在本地共享时，甚至当生产者向竞争对手损失的产品多于他们为自己节省的产品时，非零最优投资水平也会出现。总体而言，这种“个人利益”方法为为什么个人从事可能同时使他人受益的活动提供了简单而有力的解释。
Why should a microbe manufacture extracellular enzymes if its competitors can free-ride on these enzymes? Similarly, why should an animal place seeds into storage when others can exploit this stored resource? A solution to this general class of problems becomes apparent if one assumes that investors directly benefit from a proportion of the investments they make. Thus, when individuals benefit from a proportion p of their investments, but share the rest with other individuals in the system, then an evolutionarily stable level of investment can evolve which is higher the higher the value of p. These evolutionarily stable investment points mark the junction at which several classical games meet, so that changes in investment can move interactions from one game type to another. Non-zero optimal levels of investment also arise under conditions when investments are only shared locally, and even when producers lose more product to competitors than they save for themselves. Overall, this "personal gain" approach offers a simple yet robust explanation for why individuals engage in activities which may concomitantly benefit others.