Succession of hide–seek and pursuit–evasion at heterogeneous locations

Succession of hide–seek and pursuit–evasion at heterogeneous locations
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在不同地点连续进行捉迷藏和追击躲避

DOI:
10.1098/rsif.2014.0062
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发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Jérôme Casas
Jérôme Casas
中科院分区:
综合性期刊2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Gal;Jérôme Casas

文献摘要

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无论是在免疫系统、捕食还是反恐的背景下,搜索因子与难以捉摸的目标之间的许多相互作用都由一系列步骤组成。在最简单的情况下,一个两步的过程从搜索和隐藏阶段开始,也称为捉迷藏阶段,然后是一轮追捕-逃跑阶段。我们的目标是将这两个过程联系起来,通常在一个单一的博弈论背景下单独分析,并使用不同的模型。我们定义了一个矩阵游戏,在这个游戏中,搜索者会查看固定数量的离散位置,每次只搜索一次隐藏者,隐藏者可以根据其位置以不同的概率逃脱。游戏的价值是k看起来之后被捕获的总体概率。描述了最优搜索和隐藏策略。如果搜索者只在任何一个位置看一次,那么最佳隐藏者会选择它的隐藏位置,使所有位置都具有同样的吸引力。只要观看次数低于一个容易计算的阈值,这个最佳策略就会有效;然而,在这个阈值以上,隐藏者的最佳位置是一旦被发现就有最大可能逃跑的地方。
Many interactions between searching agents and their elusive targets are composed of a succession of steps, whether in the context of immune systems, predation or counterterrorism. In the simplest case, a two-step process starts with a search-and-hide phase, also called a hide-and-seek phase, followed by a round of pursuit–escape. Our aim is to link these two processes, usually analysed separately and with different models, in a single game theory context. We define a matrix game in which a searcher looks at a fixed number of discrete locations only once each searching for a hider, which can escape with varying probabilities according to its location. The value of the game is the overall probability of capture after k looks. The optimal search and hide strategies are described. If a searcher looks only once into any of the locations, an optimal hider chooses it's hiding place so as to make all locations equally attractive. This optimal strategy remains true as long as the number of looks is below an easily calculated threshold; however, above this threshold, the optimal position for the hider is where it has the highest probability of escaping once spotted.