Inference and self-reference
Inference and self-reference
复制标题
推理和自我参照
作者：
B. V. Fraassen
在自然语言中，自我指涉似乎是可能的，并且由于对自我指涉悖论的逻辑兴趣，这一主题也有了大量的形式研究。但是当兴趣在于悖论而非自我指涉本身时，自我指涉的确切语言机制就不一定相关了。实际上，对悖论的许多分析都假定存在能够起到悖论推理作用的陈述，并探究包含此类陈述的语言的性质，而省略了对悖论性陈述是如何产生的所有讨论。
In natural language it appears that self-reference is possible, and due to logical interest in the paradoxes of self-reference, the topic has also seen a number of formal investigations. But when the interest is in the paradoxes, rather than in self-reference itself, the exact linguistic mechanisms of self-reference are not necessarily relevant. Indeed, many analyses of the paradoxes assume the existence of statements capable of playing the inferential role of the paradoxes and inquire into the nature of languages containing such statements, omitting all discussion of how the paradoxical statements are produced.1