Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes
Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes
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具有失败和异质风险态度的资源共享博弈
DOI：
10.1109/allerton.2013.6736571
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Sundaram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Hota;S. Garg;S. Sundaram
我们研究了一组参与者同时投资于共享资源的环境。资源具有失败概率和投资回报，这两者都是所有参与者总投资的函数。我们使用一个简单的参考依赖偏好模型来捕捉具有不同风险态度(风险寻求、风险中性和风险厌恶)的参与者。在这种情况下，我们证明了纯策略纳什均衡的存在唯一性，并考察了在存在不确定性的情况下，不同的风险态度对参与者策略的影响。特别地，我们证明了在均衡状态下，厌恶风险的参与者被寻求风险的参与者赶出了资源。我们比较了分散式(博弈论)和集中式环境下的失败概率，结果表明我们提出的博弈属于最优响应势博弈的一类，对于这种博弈，存在允许所有参与者收敛到均衡的简单动力学。
We study a setting where a set of players simultaneously invest in a shared resource. The resource has a probability of failure and a return on investment, both of which are functions of the total investment by all players. We use a simple reference dependent preference model to capture players with heterogeneous risk attitudes (risk seeking, risk neutral and risk averse). We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this setting and examine the effect of different risk attitudes on players' strategies in the presence of uncertainty. In particular, we show that at the equilibrium, risk averse players are pushed out of the resource by risk seeking players. We compare the failure probabilities in the decentralized (game-theoretic) and centralized settings, and show that our proposed game belongs to the class of best response potential games, for which there are simple dynamics that allow all players to converge to the equilibrium.