Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance
Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance
复制标题
破产作为隐性健康保险
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2329327
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Neale Mahoney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Neale Mahoney
本文考察了家庭从破产宣告能力中获得的隐性健康保险。利用资产豁免法的多种变化来源，我表明，破产财务成本更高的无保险家庭的自付医疗费用更高，这取决于所接受的护理金额。反过来，我发现面临风险的财富越大的家庭更有可能持有医疗保险。破产的隐性保险扭曲了保险范围的决定。通过微观模拟模型，我计算出最优的庇古罚金是《平价医疗法案》（Affordable Care Act）下平均罚金的四分之三。
This paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy. Exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law, I show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out-of-pocket medical payments, conditional on the amount of care received. In turn, I find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance. The implicit insurance from bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision. Using a microsimulation model, I calculate that the optimal Pigovian penalties are three-quarters as large as the average penalties under the Affordable Care Act.
美国追踪研究：收入动态追踪研究
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
季刊家計経済研究 79
影响因子：
--
作者：
村上あかね;チャールズ・ユウジ・ホリオカ
通讯作者：
チャールズ・ユウジ・ホリオカ