Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
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DOI：
10.1209/0295-5075/84/50007
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发表时间：
2008-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Danku, Z.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Szolnoki, A.;Perc, M.;Danku, Z.
研究了囚徒困境博弈中合作的演化，其中最初所有参与者通过规则图连接，每个参与者有四个邻居。在策略进化的同时，玩家可以建立新的联系，从而永久地扩展他们的社区，前提是他们已经成功地将自己的策略传递给对手。我们表明，这一简单的共同进化规则将合作者的生存障碍转移到更高的背叛诱惑，并导致高度异质的相互作用网络，其程度分布具有指数拟合的最佳特征。特别是，存在一个促进合作的最优最大度，保证了有影响力的参与者之间的最佳信息交换。中国人民解放军版权所有，2008
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential fit best characterizing their degree distributions. In particular, there exist an optimal maximal degree for the promotion of cooperation, warranting the best exchange of information between influential players. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2008