Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
复制标题
合同能解决套牢问题吗？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1351777
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Schmitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eva I. Hoppe;P. Schmitz
在合同理论文献中，关于合同是否可以缓解敲诈勒索问题存在着激烈的争论，特别是在无法阻止重新谈判的情况下。最终，这个问题必须根据经验来回答。作为第一步，我们对 960 名参与者进行了实验室实验。我们考虑直接使非投资方受益的投资。虽然根据标准理论，如果不能排除重新谈判的可能性，签订合同将毫无用处，但我们发现，与无合同处理相比，期权合同显着提高了投资激励。这一发现可能归因于 Hart 和 Moore (2008) 最近的想法，即合同可以作为参考点。
In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore's (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.
DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.4.1608
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Goldlücke
通讯作者：
Goldlücke