Banks and Economic Growth: Implications from Japanese History
Banks and Economic Growth: Implications from Japanese History
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银行与经济增长：日本历史的影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.239957
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Ramseyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Miwa;J. Ramseyer
20世纪50年代和60年代，亚历山大·格申克龙（Alexander Gerschenkron）声称银行促进了“落后”国家的经济增长。在20世纪90年代和21世纪初，许多理论家同样认为银行促进增长。他们的理由是，银行之所以能做到这一点，是因为它们拥有上级监控和筛选能力。通过这些能力，银行可以减少信息不对称，减少由此带来的道德风险和逆向选择，从而改善信贷配置。作为一个快速增长但据称以银行为中心的经济体，日本在这些关于金融和增长的讨论中发挥着重要作用。观察家认为，在20世纪世纪早期，日本企业严重依赖银行债务。那些优先获得债务的公司表现优于其他公司，而那些属于财阀集团的公司通过其附属银行获得了优先贷款。根据世纪上半叶的数据，我们要问，日本银行是否扮演了格申克龙和现代理论家赋予它们的角色。尽管通常的帐户，我们发现他们没有。日本不是一个以银行为中心的经济体;相反，公司绝大多数依赖于股权融资。在这个经济体中，能够获得银行信贷的公司并没有比竞争对手表现更好;相反，公司并没有从这种信贷中获得任何优势。在这个世界里，财阀并没有操纵银行来偏袒关联公司;相反，财阀银行向关联公司提供的贷款（如果有的话）几乎不比这些公司在银行的存款多。在上个世纪的前半叶，日本企业几乎所有的资金都是通过分散的竞争性资本市场获得的。
In the 1950s and 60s, Alexander Gerschenkron claimed that banks facilitate economic growth among "backward" countries. In 1990s and 2000s, many theorists similarly claim that banks promote growth. Banks do so by their superior monitoring and screening capabilities, they reason. Through those capabilities, banks reduce informational asymmetries and the attendent moral hazard and adverse selection, and thereby improve the allocation of credit. As a fast-growth but allegedly bank-centered economy, Japan plays an important part in these discussions of finance and growth. In early 20th century Japan firms relied heavily on bank debt, observers argue. Those firms with preferential access to debt outperformed the others, and those that were part of the zaibatsu corporate groups obtained that preferential access through their affiliated banks. With data from the first half of the century, we ask whether Japanese banks performed the roles Gerschenkron and modern theorists assign them. Notwithstanding the usual accounts, we find that they did not. Japan was not a bank-centered economy; instead, firms relied overwhelmingly on equity finance. It was not an economy where firms with access to bank credit outperformed their rivals; instead, firms earned no advantage from such access. And it was not a world where the zaibatsu manipulated their banks to favor affiliated firms; instead, zaibatsu banks loaned affiliated firms little more (if any) than the deposits those firms had made with the banks. During the first half of the last century, Japanese firms obtained almost all their funds through decentralized, competitive capital markets.
武田晴仁：“财阀多元化及其管理组织，桥本十郎和武田晴仁合编。日本的经济发展和商业集团”东京大学出版社。
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