Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
复制标题
与外部性讨价还价的周期性延迟
DOI：
10.2307/2298080
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Moldovanu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Jehiel;B. Moldovanu
买方之间的外部性被证明会导致卖方和几个买方之间的谈判延迟。即使在没有截止日期的情况下，在随机匹配的完美完整信息设置中也会出现延迟。在有期限的情况下，我们可以识别出正面和负面外部性的延迟，而在没有期限的情况下，我们发现(1)当外部性为正面时，具有有限回忆的纯策略中不存在表现出延迟的SPNE；(2)当外部性为负时，所有具有有限回忆的SPNE都可能具有长时间的等待与短时间的活动交替的特性，这就是周期性延迟现象。
Externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers. Delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline. While with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities, without a deadline we find that (1) when externalities are positive, there exists no SPNE in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay; (2) when externalities are negative, it may happen that all SPNE with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity: This is the cyclical delay phenomenon.