The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
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党派不公正划分的经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Wolitzky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Kolotilin;A. Wolitzky
在美国，国会选区的边界通常由政治党派划定。在由此产生的党派划分选区问题中，设计者将选民划分为大小相等的选区，目标是赢得尽可能多的选区。当设计者可以完美地预测每个人将如何投票时，解决方案是将不利的选民打包到同质的选区中，并在每个选区都包含绝大多数有利选民的选区中筛选有利选民。我们研究更现实的情况下，设计师面临的总和个人层面的不确定性，提供条件下，适当的概括的包装和裂纹的解决方案保持最佳，并分析比较静态。我们发现的所有最优选区划分方案都相当于隔离对选区划分的特殊情况，即所有足够不利的选民类型都被隔离在同质区中，而其余类型则以负向竞争模式匹配。在方法论上，我们利用了选区划分（将选民划分为选区）和信息设计（将世界状态划分为信号）之间的数学联系。
In the United States, the boundaries of congressional districts are often drawn by political partisans. In the resulting partisan gerrymandering problem, a designer partitions voters into equal-sized districts with the goal of winning as many districts as possible. When the designer can perfectly predict how each individual will vote, the solution is to pack unfavorable voters into homogeneous districts and crack favorable voters across districts that each contain a bare majority of favorable voters. We study the more realistic case where the designer faces both aggregate and individual-level uncertainty, provide conditions under which appropriate generalizations of the pack and crack solution remain optimal, and analyze comparative statics. All districting plans that we find to be optimal are equivalent to special cases of segregate-pair districting, a generalization of pack and crack where all sufficiently unfavorable voter types are segregated in homogeneous districts, and the remaining types are matched in a negatively assortative pattern. Methodologically, we exploit a mathematical connection between gerrymandering—partitioning voters into districts—and information design—partitioning states of the world into signals.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2913916
发表时间：
2016-11
期刊：
ERN: Search
影响因子：
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作者：
A. Kolotilin;Tymofiy Mylovanov;Andriy Zapechelnyuk;Ming Li
通讯作者：
A. Kolotilin;Tymofiy Mylovanov;Andriy Zapechelnyuk;Ming Li