Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism
Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1011734108
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发表时间：
2011-02-15
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Gabrieli, John D.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Moran, Joseph M.;Young, Liane L.;Gabrieli, John D.
高功能自闭症（ASD）的特点是在社会交往中存在现实生活中的困难;然而，这些人通常在需要理解他人信仰和意图的实验室测试中取得成功。这一悖论表明，心理理论（ToM）的缺陷，在成人ASD尚未被证明在实验任务引发的ToM的判断。我们测试了ASD成年人是否会表现出非典型的道德判断时，他们需要考虑的意图（基于心理理论）和一个人的行为的结果。在实验1中，ASD和神经型（NT）的参与者进行了ToM任务，旨在测试错误信念的理解。在实验2中，同样的ASD参与者和一组新的NT参与者判断行为的道德允许性，在2（意图：中性/消极）× 2（结果：中性/消极）的设计。虽然在错误信念任务上没有组间差异，但在道德判断任务中，对意外伤害的判断存在选择性差异，而对中性行为、企图伤害或故意伤害的判断则没有差异。与NT组不同，NT组认为意外伤害比企图伤害在道德上错误更少，ASD组并没有可靠地判断意外伤害和企图伤害在道德上不同。在判断意外伤害时，ASD参与者似乎对有关一个人无辜意图的信息表现出不足的依赖，并且作为直接结果，过度依赖行动的负面结果。这些发现揭示了整合心理状态信息的障碍（e。例如，在一个实施例中，信仰，意图）的道德判断。
High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person's beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person's actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) x 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person's innocent intention and, as a direct result, an over-reliance on the action's negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e. g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.