Formally Certifying the Security of Digital Signature Schemes
Formally Certifying the Security of Digital Signature Schemes
复制标题
正式认证数字签名方案的安全性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Federico Olmedo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Santiago Zanella Béguelin;G. Barthe;B. Grégoire;Federico Olmedo
给出了全域哈希签名方案在自适应选择消息攻击下存在不可伪造性的两个机器检验证明。这些证明形式化了Bellare和Rogaway的原始论证，并通过crown提供了一个更严格的伪造概率约束的最优约简。这两种证明都是使用CertiCrypt开发的，CertiCrypt是一种通用框架，用于形式化计算模型中加密系统的精确安全证明。由于CertiCrypt是在ecoq证明助手之上实现的，因此证明是高度可信的，可以独立且全自动地进行验证。
We present two machine-checked proofs of the existentialunforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks of the FullDomain Hash signature scheme. These proofs formalize the originalargument of Bellare and Rogaway, and an optimal reduction by Coronthat provides a tighter bound on the probability of a forgery. Bothproofs are developed using CertiCrypt, a general framework toformalize exact security proofs of cryptographic systems in thecomputational model. Since CertiCrypt is implemented on top of theCoq proof assistant, the proofs are highly trustworthy and can beverified independently and fully automatically.