Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions
Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.854
复制
发表时间：
2007-05-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Budescu, David V.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Maciejovsky, Boris;Budescu, David V.
有强有力的证据表明，在具有明显正确解决方案的智力任务上，团队比个人表现得更好。通常，这些研究假设群体成员有共同的目标。作者扩展了这条研究路线，用竞争性拍卖取代了标准的面对面的群体互动，允许相互冲突的个人激励。在一系列涉及著名的沃森选择任务的研究中，他们证明竞争性拍卖产生的学习效果与标准的群体互动同样令人印象深刻，他们揭示了从这些机构到新的推理问题的具体和一般知识转移。作者认为报酬反馈和信息汇集是这些发现背后的驱动因素，并在集体归纳的理论框架中解释了这些因素。
There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction.