An evolutionary modeling approach for designing a contractual REDD plus payment scheme
An evolutionary modeling approach for designing a contractual REDD plus payment scheme
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用于设计合同 REDD 加支付方案的演化建模方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.04.010
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Miao Zhuang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sheng Jichuan;Wu You;Zhang Mingyang;Miao Zhuang
经济发展与生态环境可持续发展目标不同，REDD+项目实施者与捐助者之间存在着权衡与博弈行为。本文分析了REDD+实施者和捐赠者的演化行为对环境服务支付的影响。在理论分析框架下，通过演化博弈模型分析了不同生态系统服务契约支付情景下实施者和捐助者的演化稳定策略，探讨了REDD+契约支付问题。在此基础上，采用非参数局部回归方法，对5个REDD+国家（刚果、巴西、厄瓜多尔、尼泊尔和乌干达）基于市场机制的生态补偿制度安排进行了实证分析。研究结果表明：首先，当机会成本小于环境效益时，即使没有正式的合同生态补偿制度，一些中高收入发展中国家也有足够的动力保护森林。无论工业化国家是否为生态系统服务付费，这种保护都会发生。第二，当机会成本大于环境效益时，在工业化国家不支付相关生态系统服务费用的情况下，发展中国家一般不会主动保护森林。第三，当有足够的合同生态系统服务付费罚款时，发展中国家将保护森林，工业化国家将支付生态系统服务。最后，合同规定的生态系统服务付费罚款与减少排放的费用有关。尼泊尔的边际效应最大，乌干达的边际效应最小。这些结果对REDD+方案的设计和实施具有一定的启示：应优先考虑基于市场的契约性PES方案，以规范工业化国家和发展中国家在PES方案中的行为。制定有针对性和有区别的生态系统服务付费契约计划需要对不同国家的减排成本进行核算。
Economic development and sustainable ecological and environmental development generally target different goals, and there are trade-offs and game-like behaviors between implementers and donors in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) program. This paper analyzed the effects of evolutionary behaviors of REDD+ implementers and donors with respect to environmental service payments. Within a theoretical analysis framework, the evolutionary stable strategies of the implementers and donors under different contractual payments for ecosystem services (PES) scenarios are analyzed to explore contractual REDD+ payments through evolutionary game models. On this basis, anon-parametric local regression approach is used to analyze arrange of market-based contractual PES schemes in five REDD+ countries (Congo, Brazil, Ecuador, Nepal and Uganda). The results show the following: First, when the opportunity costs are less than the environmental benefits, some middle and high income developing countries are sufficiently incentivized to conserve forests, even without formal contractual PES scheme. This conservation occurs regardless of whether the industrialized countries will pay for the ecosystem services. Second, when the opportunity costs are greater than the environmental benefits, developing countries will generally not take the initiative to conserve forests when industrialized countries do not pay for the associated ecosystem services. Third, when there are enough contractual PES fines, developing countries will conserve forests, and the industrialized countries will pay for the ecosystem services. Finally, contractual PES fines are related to the costs of reducing emissions. Nepal has the largest marginal effect, and Uganda has the smallest. These results have implications for REDD+ program design and implementation: market-based contractual PES scheme should be given priority to regulate behavior of industrialized countries and developing countries in the PES scheme. Developing a targeted and differentiated contractual PES scheme requires an accounting of emission reduction costs in different countries.