Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping

Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping
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军民关系与维持和平

DOI:
10.4324/9781315000909
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发表时间:
1998
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Michael C. Williams
Michael C. Williams
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Michael C. Williams

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1990年代后期的维持和平是一项复杂而多样的任务,文职人员和军事人员比以往任何时候都更加密切地合作。然而,当联合国等国际机构做出战略决策时,军方的投入不足;在外地,存在着文化上的冲突、指挥和控制安排上的混乱以及行动协调不足。这些问题也影响到北约等地区组织。自1994年以来,笨拙的维和行动管理和参差不齐的成就水平导致了联合国维和行动数量的下降。本文认为,需要重新评估维持和平特派团各级-战略、战术和行动-的文职和军事专业知识和咨询意见之间的平衡。在战略一级:*任务必须明确,必须对局势的需要和现有资源作出反应*所有主要角色,军事和文职人员之间必须定期进行对话;联合国总部的军事人员能力应提高效率,并应向安全理事会负责*主要部队派遣国应系统地参与确定任务授权以及审查行动计划*所有主要部队派遣国的高级军官应常驻特派团的外地总部。在行动一级:*应加强秘书长特别代表——联合国维持和平特派团团长的办公室。在非联合国行动中,需要加强高级代表的权威*需要培养一批具有维持和平经验的文职官员;在与军方打交道时,需要制定文职特派团负责人遵循的标准操作程序*应该更加强调军事科学的“软”方面——管理资源、文职控制和人权*应该解决文职人员和非政府组织不愿与军方接触的问题。从20世纪90年代的维持和平行动中获得了许多经验,但军事和文职参与者都必须取得相当大的进展,才能说他们已经建立了一种伙伴关系,使他们成为有效的干预力量
Peacekeeping in the late 1990s is a complex and diverse task, in which civilian and military personnel are working together to a greater degree than ever before. However, when an international body such as the UN takes strategic decisions, it does so with inadequate input from the military; in the field, there are clashes of culture, confusion over command and control arrangements and insufficient operational coordination. These issues also affect regional organisations such as NATO. The awkward management of operations and their uneven level of achievement have contributed to a decline in the number of UN peacekeeping operations since 1994. This paper argues that the balance between civilian and military expertise and advice at all levels of a peacekeeping mission - strategic, tactical and operational - needs to be reappraised. At the strategic level: * mandates must be clear, and must respond both to the needs of the situation and to the resources available * there must be regular dialogue between all the principal players, military and civilian; the military-staff capacity at UN headquarters should be made more effective, and should be responsible to the Security Council * major troop-contributing countries should be systematically involved in determining mandates, as well as in reviewing operational plans * senior military officers from all large troop-contributing countries should be based at a mission's field headquarters. At the operational level: * the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General - the head of a UN peacekeeping mission - should be strengthened. In non-UN operations, the authority of the High Representative needs to be increased * a cadre of civilian officials with peacekeeping experience needs to be developed; standard operating procedures for the civilian head of a mission to follow when dealing with the military need to be developed * greater emphasis should be placed on the 'softer' aspects of military science - managing resources, civilian control and human rights * the reluctance of civilians and non-governmental organisations to engage with the military should be addressed. Much experience has been gained from the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, but both military and civilian participants must make considerably more progress before they can be said to have forged a partnership that makes them an effective intervention force