TYING IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI-HOMING
TYING IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI-HOMING
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00426.x
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发表时间：
2010-09-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Choi, Jay Pil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Choi, Jay Pil
本文分析了双边市场中当经济主体通过参与多个平台进行多归属以获取最大网络收益时搭售对市场竞争和社会福利的影响。该模型表明，搭售会吸引更多消费者使用多家庭，并使更多消费者可以获得特定平台的独家内容，这对内容提供商有利。因此，如果允许多归属，搭售可以提高福利，即使在没有多归属的情况下其福利影响是负面的。因此，该分析对于多归属盛行的行业中最近的反垄断案件具有重要意义。
This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.