Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2592363
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发表时间：
2015-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Flavio Delbono;L. Lambertini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Flavio Delbono;L. Lambertini
我们表明，标准的论点，根据供应函数均衡排名伯特兰和古诺均衡之间的中间可能会被逆转。我们证明了这一结果在一个静态的寡头垄断博弈中，供应函数竞争和古诺竞争产生一个独特的纳什均衡，而价格设定产生一个连续的纳什均衡。存在贝特朗利润高于古诺利润的参数区域，后者高于供给函数均衡。当价格设定模仿合谋时，就会发生这种典型排名的逆转。然后，我们表明，利润的逆转是负责逆转的福利表现的行业。
We show that the standard argument according to which supply function equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function competition and Cournot competition yield a unique Nash equilibrium, whereas price setting yields a continuum of Nash equilibria. There are parameter regions in which Bertrand profits are higher than Cournot ones, with the latter being higher than in the supply function equilibrium. Such reversal of the typical ranking occurs when price-setting mimics collusion. We then show that the reversal in profits is responsible for a reversal in the welfare performance of the industry.