Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
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政客的激励契约和选举竞争
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-004-0555-z
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
H. Gersbach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Gersbach
如果政治家是短期导向的，或者未来的选举不能充分反映过去政策的成功，民主选举就不能激励政治家承担长期的社会利益项目。当政治家能够提供激励契约并在连任时生效时，契约和选举的层次性可以缓解这种低效的政治决策。如果公众不能承诺自己的连任计划，或者如果公众不确定政治家的时间偏好，这种机制仍然有效。在不承诺的情况下，激励合同可能需要包括“金降落伞”条款。
When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians’ time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.