PRETENDING AND BELIEVING - ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF TOMM
PRETENDING AND BELIEVING - ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF TOMM
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DOI：
10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9
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发表时间：
1994-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
LESLIE, AM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
LESLIE, AM
心理因果关系的常识概念在儿童中很早就自发地出现。这对我们理解心灵/大脑及其发展有什么影响？根据现有的证据，儿童的“心理理论”很可能是产生特定领域学习的专门机制（ToMM）的生长和运作的结果。儿童自闭症的“心理理论”早期自发发展的失败可以理解为这种机制的生长和功能受损。ToMM构建了以主体为中心的情境描述或“元表征”。以主体为中心的描述将主体与信息联系起来。通过将行为与代理人对命题真理的态度联系起来，ToMM使代理人行为的常识因果解释成为可能，因为这些行为是想象的而不是物理的。两个早期的态度概念，假装和相信，根据目前的一些调查结果进行了讨论。
Commonsense notions of psychological causality emerge early and spontaneously in the child. What implications does this have for our understanding of the mind/brain and its development? In the light of available evidence, the child's ''theory of mind'' is plausibly the result of the growth and functioning of a specialized mechanism (ToMM) that produces domain-specific learning. The failure of early spontaneous development of ''theory of mind'' in childhood autism can be understood in terms of an impairment in the growth and functioning of this mechanism. ToMM constructs agent-centered descriptions of situations or ''metarepresentations''. Agent-centered descriptions place agents in relation to information. By relating behavior to the attitudes agents take to the truth of propositions, ToMM makes possible a commonsense causal interpretation of agents' behavior as the result of circumstances that are imaginary rather than physical. Two early attitude concepts, pretends and believes, are discussed in the light of some current findings.