Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following stroke

Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following stroke
复制标题

DOI:
10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00005-0
复制
发表时间:
1999-04-01
期刊:
影响因子:
3.4
通讯作者:
Winner, E
Winner, E
中科院分区:
心理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Happé, F;Brownell, H;Winner, E

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

将思想和感受归因于自己和他人的能力(“心理理论”)被假设为具有先天的神经基础和专门的认知机制。支持这一建议的证据来自自闭症;一种以大脑为基础的发育障碍,其特征似乎是心理理论受损,尽管有时具有良好的一般推理技能/智商。到目前为止,还没有具体的后天心理理论障碍的报告。本研究考察了患有右半球中风的成年人的心理理论,这是一组已知的表现出实用主义和社会困难的人。在一项使用故事材料的研究和两项使用漫画的研究中,患者对需要归因于心理状态的材料(例如无知,错误信念)的理解明显不如他们对非心理控制材料的理解。来自健康老年受试者和一小群左半球患者(接受修改形式的任务)的数据表明,这种精神凝视任务的损害不是任务难度的函数。这些发现支持了心理理论的专用认知系统的概念,并表明健康的右半球在心理状态的归因中发挥作用。(C)1999 Elsevier Science B. V.保留所有权利。
The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others ('theory of mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired theory of mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired theory of mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined theory of mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental stare tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for theory of mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.