Leadership and Competition in Network Supply Chains
Leadership and Competition in Network Supply Chains
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1070.0752
复制
发表时间：
2008-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Majumder;A. Srinivasan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Majumder;A. Srinivasan
本文考虑了网络供应链的价格依赖的需求，建模为大型非循环网络。这种大型网络在汽车和服装行业很常见。我们开发了一个模型来分析这些大规模的问题，涉及长序列的合同的效果，并表明，合同领导，以及领导者在网络中的位置，影响整个供应链的性能。我们推广Spengler（Spengler，J. 1950.纵向一体化和反垄断政策。J.PoliticalEconomy.58347 - 352）应用于特定供应链的“合同树”上的博弈，并扩展了双重边缘化的概念，使得它可以以转换的形式应用于“合同树”中一个成员向另一个成员提供的每个合同。我们构造了一个算法来找到均衡解，并得出最佳的领导者的位置（“最佳”的领导者的位置，最大化供应链的总利润）。我们的工作形式化了许多直观的见解;例如，会员利润是由系统范围内而不是个人成本决定的。最后，我们模拟竞争的供应链（两个异构树和多个相同的树）之间的古诺竞争，并显示领导地位的变化，以及成本结构的均衡的影响。
This paper considers network supply chains with price dependent demand by modelling them as large acyclic networks. Such large networks are common in the automobile and apparel industries. We develop a model to analyze the effect of these large-scale problems involving long sequences of contracts, and show that contract leadership, as well as leader position in the network, affect the performance of the entire supply chain. We generalize Spengler (Spengler, J. 1950. Vertical integration and anti-trust policy. J. Political Econom.58 347--352) to a game on a “contract tree” for a particular supply chain and extend the concept of double marginalization so that it can be applied in the form of a transformation to each contract that is offered by one member to another in the “contract tree.” We construct an algorithm to find the equilibrium solution, and derive the optimal location of the leader (“optimal” being the leader location that maximizes total supply chain profits). Our work formalizes many intuitive insights; for example, member profits are determined by systemwide rather than individual costs. Finally, we model Cournot competition between competing supply chains (both two heterogeneous trees and multiple identical trees) and show the effect of changes in leader position as well as cost structure on the equilibrium.