Contagion

Contagion
复制标题

DOI:
10.1111/1467-937x.00121
复制
发表时间:
2000-01-01
影响因子:
5.8
通讯作者:
Morris, S
Morris, S
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Morris, S

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

无限群体中的每个玩家都与该群体的有限子集进行战略性互动。假设每个参与者在每个时期的二元选择是对前一时期群体选择的最佳响应。最初仅由有限的一组玩家进行的行为何时可以传播到整个群体?本文描述了任意本地交互系统何时可能发生这种传染。当局部交互足够均匀并且邻居增长较低时,即在 k 步中可以接触到的玩家数量不会在 k 中呈指数增长时,就会发生最大传染。
Each player in an infinite population interacts strategically with a finite subset of that population. Suppose each player's binary choice in each period is a best response to the population choices of the previous period. When can behaviour that is initially played by only a finite set of players spread to the whole population? This paper characterizes when such contagion is possible for arbitrary local interaction systems. Maximal contagion occurs when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbour growth, i.e. the number of players who can be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k.