Committees as Substitutes for Commitment
Committees as Substitutes for Commitment
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委员会作为承诺的替代品
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alessandro Riboni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alessandro Riboni
在本文中，委员会通过使用内生默认（或现状）政策进行动态投票游戏来协商政策。我表明，通过保持强大的议程制定权来加入委员会是决策者承诺执行一项政策的一种方式，而在没有委员会的情况下，该政策在时间上不一致。内生现状的纪律作用和委员会内部偏好的异质性是获得这一结果的两个关键因素。作为一个激励性的例子，本文重点关注货币政策的时间一致性。
In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy.