Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions
Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions
复制标题
排他性公共物品的系列成本分摊：一般成本函数
DOI：
10.1007/s001990050217
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
J. Dearden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Dearden
一群人聚在一起分担成本并确定部分排他性公共物品的产出分配。我们证明，对于满足 Spence-Mirlees 排序条件的一般成本函数和偏好，序列成本分摊公式（Moulin，1994）具有显着的激励特性。首先，使用序列公式的直接经济机制是防联盟策略的、无嫉妒的并且满足独立性质。其次，串行机制涉及部分排除，这对于减少搭便车问题很重要。
A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, adirecteconomic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property. Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.