Evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions
Evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions
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发表时间：
2019-05
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通讯作者：
Qi Su;Alex McAvoy;Long Wang;M. Nowak
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作者：
Qi Su;Alex McAvoy;Long Wang;M. Nowak
环境对种群的进化动态有很大的影响。在内在和外在因素的驱动下，环境受到自然界不断变化的影响。为了模拟一个不断变化的环境，我们开发了一个进化动力学的框架与随机博弈过渡，其中个人的行为与他们在一个时间步玩的游戏一起决定下一个时间步要玩的游戏。在这个框架内，我们研究了结构化种群中合作的演化，并发现了一个简单的规则：如果利他行为提供的收益$B$与相应的成本$c$之比超过$k-k '$，即$B/c> k-k'$，则自然选择倾向于合作而不是背叛，其中$k$是邻居的平均数量，$k '$捕获了游戏转换的影响。我们表明，即使每个单独的游戏反对合作，允许它们之间的过渡可以导致一个有利的结果合作。即使是不同游戏中的微小变化也能显著促进合作。我们的工作表明，环境和个人的行为之间的相互依赖性可以解释在现实系统中的大规模合作，即使合作是昂贵的相对于它的好处。
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continuous change in nature. To model an ever-changing environment, we develop a framework of evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions, where individuals' behaviors together with the games they play in one time step decide the games to be played next time step. Within this framework, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule: natural selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, $b$, to the corresponding cost, $c$, exceeds $k-k'$, which means $b/c>k-k'$, where $k$ is the average number of neighbors and $k'$ captures the effects from game transitions. We show that even if each individual game opposes cooperation, allowing for a transition between them can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. Even small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our work suggests that interdependence between the environment and the individuals' behaviors may explain the large-scale cooperation in realistic systems even when cooperation is expensive relative to its benefit.