Challenge Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention: between ideal and reality
Challenge Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention: between ideal and reality
复制标题
《化学武器公约》下的核查挑战：理想与现实之间
DOI：
10.1080/10736700.2017.1380429
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tatsuya Abe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mariko Kawano;Tatsuya Abe
1997年《化学武器公约》规定的质疑-视察制度被视为“划时代”的程序。任何缔约国都可以“随时随地”请求质疑视察，而无权拒绝。然而，尽管其在理论上具有很高的价值，但尚未要求进行质疑检查。没有任何此类请求有法律、政治和其他原因。然而，在叙利亚化学武器的背景下，已经采取了一些临时措施，可以考虑替代质疑检查制度。这些发展对该系统产生了影响，大部分是负面的。未来很可能会采用临时替代措施，但其使用将取决于具体情况。尽管质疑-检查制度将来可能不会被采用，但其理论上的可用性仍然存在，并在一定程度上有助于防止违规行为。
The challenge-inspection system under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention has been regarded as an “epoch-making” procedure. Any state party can request a challenge inspection “anytime, anywhere, without right of refusal.” Yet, despite its high value in theory, no challenge inspection has yet been requested. There are legal, political, and other reasons that account for the absence of any such request. However, in the context of Syria's chemical weapons, several ad hoc measures have been taken that could be considered alternative to the challenge-inspection system. These developments have implications, largely negative, for that system. It is likely that ad hoc alternative measures will be employed in the future, though their use will depend on the situation. Although the challenge-inspection system may not be employed in the future, its theoretical availability remains and contributes to the prevention of noncompliance to a certain extent.