The spatial effect of fiscal decentralization on haze pollution in China
The spatial effect of fiscal decentralization on haze pollution in China
复制标题
财政分权对中国雾霾污染的空间效应
DOI：
10.1007/s11356-021-14176-y
复制
发表时间：
2021-05-03
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Zhu, Yeman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cheng, Zhonghua;Zhu, Yeman
中国中央集权下的财政分权制度影响着地方的经济和环境政策，从而对环境质量产生重要影响。本文利用2003 - 2018年中国285个城市的面板数据和空间杜宾模型，实证分析了财政分权对雾霾污染的影响及其作用机制。结果表明，财政分权的增加会显著加剧区域内及周边地区的雾霾污染，这一结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。此外，财政分权对雾霾污染的影响在城市规模、区域和样本周期上存在显著的异质性。此外，机制分析表明，财政分权通过加大基础设施建设、减少环境规制、加剧市场分割等方式加剧了雾霾污染。进一步分析发现，一方面，地方政府有能力根据自己的意愿和利益控制本地区的雾霾污染，但另一方面，周边地区环境政策的调整会明显抑制本地区环境政策的控制，从而使地方政府的雾霾污染得不到有效控制。这实质上是地方政府在环境政策上的“竞相压底”现象。
The fiscal decentralization system under China's political centralization affects local economic and environmental policies, and thus has an important impact on environmental quality. This paper uses the panel data of 285 cities in China from 2003 to 2018 and the spatial Durbin model to empirically analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on haze pollution and its mechanism. The results show that the increase in fiscal decentralization will significantly aggravate the haze pollution in and around the region, and this conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests. Moreover, the impact of fiscal decentralization on haze pollution has significant heterogeneity in the size and region of the city, and the sample period. In addition, mechanism analyses show that fiscal decentralization has aggravated haze pollution by increasing infrastructure construction, reducing environmental regulations, and intensifying market segmentation. Further analyses reveal that, on the one hand, local governments have the ability to control haze pollution in their own regions according to their own wishes and interests, but on the other hand, adjustments to environmental policies in surrounding areas will significantly inhibit the control of environmental policies in the region, thereby making local governments haze pollution has not been effectively controlled. This is essentially a "Race to bottom" phenomenon among local governments in environmental policies.