Scalar vs. Epistemic Vagueness: Evidence from Approximators
Scalar vs. Epistemic Vagueness: Evidence from Approximators
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标量与认知模糊性：来自近似器的证据
DOI：
10.3765/salt.v17i0.3091
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Stateva
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
U. Sauerland;P. Stateva
本文研究的是自然语言中的模糊性。更具体地说，我们讨论了使模糊断言或多或少精确的词汇方法。具有这种效果的表达的例子有近似、绝对、确定和粗略地说。虽然这些表达中的许多都是修饰语和副词，但有些这样的表达既不是修饰语也不是副词。因此，出于本文的目的，我们将作出模糊断言的表达式称为或多或少精确的近似符。我们的主要主张是，这种表达的分布为这样一种观点提供了证据，即语言中的模糊至少有两种形式，我们称之为标量模糊和认知模糊1我们假设模糊的特征是产生索里茨悖论。考虑(1)到(3)中的三个例子。在每一种情况下，都会经历一个SoritesParadox推理：如果我们接受这样的假设：“如果哈利是秃头，那么即使他比他多一根头发，他仍然会是秃顶，这总是正确的。”这听起来是无辜的，由此得出的结论是，(1)没有告诉我们任何关于哈利头上有多少头发的信息。类似地，如果我们接受这样的前提，(2)将告诉我们堆中有多少沙粒，如果我们接受这样的前提：“如果某个东西是一堆沙子，而我们从它上面移走一粒，它仍然是一堆沙子。”最后，如果我们接受这样的假设：“如果约翰在6点到达，那么(3)如果他比实际到达晚一秒，那么(3)也不会告诉我们关于约翰到达的时间的任何事情。”
This paper is about vagueness in natural language. More specifically, we discuss lexical means of making vague assertions more or less precise. Examples of expressions that have this effect are approximately, absolutely, definitely, and roughly speaking. While many of these expressions are modifiers and adverbs, some such expressions are neither. Hence, for the purposes of this paper we call expressions that make vague assertions more or less precise Approximators. Our main claim is that the distribution of such expressions provides evidence for the view that vagueness in language comes in at least two varieties, which we call Scalar Vagueness and Epistemic Vagueness.1 We assume that vagueness is characterized by giving rise to the SoritesParadox. Consider the three examples in (1) through (3). In each case a SoritesParadox reasoning goes through: If we accept the premise that “If Harry is bald, it’s always true that, even if he had one more hair than he does, he would still be bald.”, which sounds innocent, it follows that (1) does not tell us anything about the number of hairs on Harry’s head. Similarly (2) would tell us how many grains of sand there are in the heap if we accept the premise that “if something is a heap of sand and we remove one grain from it, it is still a heap of sand.”. Finally, (3) wouldn’t tell us anything about the time of John’s arrival if we accept the premise that “if John arrived at 6 o’clock, then (3) would still be true if he arrived one second later than he actually did.”